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JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1953). The Fifth Judicial District
Court for Washington County, State of Utah, certified its Order of
Formal Probate of Will, Construction of Will, and Denial of
Petition for Declaration of Partial Intestacy as a final order,
pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Petitioner/Appellant Ryan W. Scarritt lists nine separate
"Issues for Review" in his brief on appeal.

The Petitioner's

"issues," however, merely provide a confused and repetitive summary
of the Petitioner's arguments.

Appellee Rodney K. Orton believes

that the following statements better frame the issues presented for
review:
1.

Whether the District Court erred in concluding that

Curtiss S. Scarritt died testate as to all of his real property,
where the decedent's Last Will and Testament manifests a clear
intent that his personal representative sell the real property and
add the proceeds to the Testator's estate for use and distribution
under the Will.1
2.

Whether the District Court erred in concluding that

Curtiss S. Scarritt died testate as to all of his personal
property, where the decedent's Last Will and Testament makes

This issue encompasses Issues a, b, c, d, e, f, and h from
Appellant's Brief. [Appellant's Brief, at 1-2.]
s/scarritt/pldgs/appellee.gmh

various devises of personal property and then expressly provides
for distribution of "the remaining items of personal property."2
SIGNIFICANT STATUTES
The following statutes provide significant guidance in the
determination of this appeal:
(1) [The Utah Uniform Probate Code] shall
be liberally construed and applied to promote
its underlying purposes and policies.
(2) The underlying purposes and policies
of this code are: . . . (b) To discover and
make effective the intent of a decedent in
distribution of his property; . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-102 (1953).
The intention of a testator as expressed
in his will controls the legal effect of his
dispositions.
The rules of construction
expressed in the succeeding sections of this
part apply unless a contrary intention is
indicated by the will.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-603 (1953).
A will is construed to pass all property
which the testator owns at his death including
property acquired after the execution of the
will.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-604 (1953).
"Property" includes both real and personal
property or any interest therein and means
anything that may be the subject of ownership.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-201(33) (Supp. 1991).
"Personal
property"
includes
every
description
of
money,
goods,
chattels,
effects, evidences of rights in action, and
2

This issue encompasses Issues a, b, d, and i. Issue g has
never been an issue in this litigation. [Appellant's Brief, at 12.]
s/scarritt/ptdgs/appeltee.g«nh
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all written instruments by which any pecuniary
obligation, right, or title to property is
created, acknowledged, transferred, increased,
defeated, discharged, or diminished, and every
right or interest therein•
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(2)(m) (Supp. 1991).
The common law of England so far as it is
not repugnant to, or in conflict with, the
constitution of laws of the United States, or
the constitution or laws of this state, and so
far only as it is consistent with and adapted
to the natural and physical conditions of this
state and the necessities of the people
hereof, is hereby adopted, and shall be the
rule of decision in all courts of this state.
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-1 (1953).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This case comes before the Utah Supreme Court on appeal from
formal testacy proceedings before the Fifth Judicial District
Court in and for Washington County, State of Utah.

The District

Court rejected Ryan W. Scarritt's petition for a declaration that
Curtiss S. Scarritt died partially intestate.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

On July

10, 1991, the District Court entered

an order

informally probating the Last Will and Testament of Curtiss S.
Scarritt (the "Will") and appointing Appellee Rodney K. Orton to
act as personal representative.

[Order For Informal Appointment

of Personal Representative, R. 41-42.]

On July 12, 1991, Ryan W.

Scarritt (the "Petitioner") filed a Petition for Formal Probate of
Will, Construction of Will, Declaration of Partial Intestacy, and
Supervised Administration (the "Petition"), claiming that Curtiss
s/scarritt/pldgs/appeltee.gmh
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S. Scarritt (the "Testator") died partially intestate and that
Petitioner was one of the Testator's heirs.

[R. 14-17.]

On August 14, 1991, Appellee Rodney K. Orton (the "Personal
Representative") filed objections to the Petition, maintaining that
the Will disposed of all of the Testator's property, both real and
personal, that the Petitioner had been intentionally omitted from
the Will, and that the Petitioner therefore had no interest in the
Testator's

estate.

[Response

and

Objections

of

Personal

Representative to Petition for Formal Probate of Will, Construction
of

Will,

Declaration

of

Partial

Intestacy,

and

Supervised

Administration, R. 94-99.] The Personal Representative also filed
an affidavit executed by the attorney who drafted the Testator's
Will, supporting the Personal Representative's construction of the
Will.

[Affidavit of James M. Park in Opposition to Petition of

Ryan W. Scarritt, R. 83-87, a true and correct copy of which is
included in the Addendum to this brief.]

On August 22, 1991, the

District Court heard oral arguments on the Petition.

[Reporter's

Hearing Transcript of August 22, 1991.]
C.

Disposition in the District Court.

On September 5, 1991, the District Court issued a Memorandum
Decision, holding that the Will effectively disposed of all of the
Testator's real and personal property and that the Petitioner had
no interest in the Testator's estate. [Memorandum Decision, R. 1219.]

On September 25, 1991, the District Court entered its Order

of Formal Probate of Will, Construction of Will, Imposition of

s/scarritt/pldgs/appellee.gmh
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Supervised Administration and Denial of Petition for Declaration
of Partial Intestacy (the "Order of Formal Probate").

[R. 29-

39. ]
The District Court determined that the Testator intended his
real property to be sold and the proceeds to be added to his estate
for use in paying estate taxes and for distribution under the Will.
[Order of Formal Probate, Findings, JJ 19-20, R. 32-33.]
District Court

The

further determined that all of the Testator's

personal property passed under the Will. [Order of Formal Probate,
Conclusions, ff 7-14, R. 35-36.] The District Court concluded that
the Testator's residual personal property, including the real
property proceeds, passed under a provision of the Will disposing
of "the remaining items of personal property."

[Order of Formal

Probate, Conclusions, JJ 10-11, 19, R. 35-36.] The District Court
certified the Order of Formal Probate as a final, appealable order
under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Formal Probate, pp. 9-10, R. 37-38.]
D.

[Order of

This appeal followed.

Statement of Facts.

The Testator died on June 5, 1991, owning certain real and
personal property.

[Order of Formal Probate, Findings, J J 1, 9,

R. 3 0-31.] The only real property the Testator owned at his death
was a ranch located near Virgin, Utah (the "Ranch").
Formal Probate, Findings, J 20, R. 3 3.]

[Order of

The Testator was unmarried

at his death, but he was survived by two sons—Curtiss S. Scarritt,
Jr.,

and the Petitioner.

s/scarritt/pldgs/appellee.gmh

[Order of Formal Probate, Findings, JJ

-5-

10, 14, R. 31-32.]

The Testator left a valid will.

[Order of

Formal Probate, Findings, JJ 5-7, R. 3 0.]
The Testator's Will begins with a revocation of all prior
wills and codicils and provides directions for disposition of the
Testator's remains. [Will, Articles FIRST and SECOND.] The SECOND
Article of the Will then directs payment of the Testator's debts:
I hereby direct that all my just debts,
funeral expenses, and expenses of my last
illness be made as soon after my death as may
reasonably be convenient; I hereby authorize
and empower my Executor . . . to settle and
discharge [all claims made against the
estate].
The THIRD Article contains the main dispositive provisions of
the Will.

It begins with

a broad

statement

regarding the

Testator's estate:
All the rest, residue, and remainder of
my estate, both real and personal, of
whatsoever kind and nature and wheresoever the
same may be situated of which I shall die
seized or possessed to which in any way I may
be entitled at the time of my death, with the
exception of the Horace S. Scarritt Trust . .
. , I give, devise, and bequeath as follows:
Subsection A of the THIRD Article devises certain Certificates of
Deposit.
Account."

Subsection B devises the sums in the "Ferguson Capital
Subsection C devises the Testator's "race horse and

related livestock and vehicles." Subsection D devises "[a]11 other
livestock and saddle horses." Subsection E.l. devises a sherry set
and a shotgun to the Personal Representative.

s/scarritt/pldgs/appeUee.gmh

Subsection E.2. of Article THIRD provides a mechanism for
distribution of the "remaining items" of the Testator's "personal
property:"
The distribution of the remaining items of
personal property should be determined by
Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr., Rodney K. Orton and
James M. Park.
The District Court found it "significant that the testator included
in this committee two of his close personal friends and his son
Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr."

[Order of Formal Probate, Findings, 5

14, R. 31-32.]
The FIFTH Article of the Will directs that all estate and
other taxes "shall be paid out of or charged against my Utah estate
. . . as if it were a debt and without apportionment."
The SIXTH Article of the Will devises to the Testator's son,
Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr., "all articles of personal, household or
domestic use or adornment, . . . excluding only such articles of
farm and ranch machinery and equipment, together with horses and
other livestock, and such personal property as may be selected and
distributed pursuant to the provisions of Article THIRD . . . ."
The SEVENTH Article of the Will expresses the Testator's
directions with respect to disposition of the Ranch and any
"tangible personal property" not distributed in kind under previous
provisions of the Will:
I
hereby
direct
my
Personal
Representative to borrow monies against my
real property located in Virgin, Utah and to
pay whatever sums are necessary for the
maintenance, upkeep and preservation of my
ranch in Virgin, Utah . . . .
All monies
borrowed against the real property in Virgin,
s/scarritt/pldgs/appellee.gmh
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Utah are to be paid back immediately upon the
sale of said property.
I authorize my
Personal Representative to sell all real
property, together with all tangible personal
property and livestock included in my estate
and not effectively disposed of pursuant to
Articles THIRD and SIXTH hereof, at such time
or times and upon such terms and conditions as
shall seem advisable and to add the proceeds
of any such sale to my estate.
The

NINTH

Article

of

the Will

expressly

precludes

the

Petitioner from receiving any of the Testator's estate under the
Will:
I make no provision for my son, Ryan
Winthrop Scarritt, for the reason that he will
be well-provided for, following my death,
under the will of my father, Horace S.
Scarritt.
8UMMARY OF THE PER80NAL REPRESENTATIVE'S ARGUMENT
The District Court properly rejected the Petitioner's request
for a declaration of partial intestacy, because the Will disposes
of all of the Testator's real and personal property.

The primary

purpose of the Utah Uniform Probate Code is to "discover and make
effective" the decedent's intent in the distribution of his or her
property.

The "paramount objective" in interpreting a will is,

therefore, to give effect to the testator's intent. The testator's
intent must be determined by considering all of the provisions of
the will.

One of the most significant canons of construction for

determining the testator's intent is the statutory presumption that
a testator intends to pass all of his or her property under the
will and avoid intestacy. This presumption is so strong that this
Court has stated that it will adopt "any reasonable construction
s/scarritt/pldgs/appellee.gmh
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[of a will] to avoid a conclusion of intestacy."

In light of this

presumption, the Petitioner must establish that the only reasonable
construction of the Testator's Will results in intestacy.
Petitioner cannot prevail because there

is a reasonable

construction of the Will that disposes of all of the Testator's
real and personal property.

The SEVENTH Article of the Will

directs the Personal Representative to sell the Testator's real
property and to add the proceeds to the estate for use and
distribution under the Will. The doctrine of equitable conversion
provides that when a testator directs his or her real property to
be sold, the property must be regarded as personal property from
the time of testator's death and must be distributed according to
the

testator's

plan

of

personal

property

distribution.

A

testator's intent to convert realty to personalty may be shown by
express instruction, by implied direction, or by necessity in order
to carry out all of the provisions of the will. The Will at issue
in this case clearly converts the Testator's real property into
personal property.
The Testator disposed of all of his personal property under
the THIRD and SIXTH Articles of the Will.

The SIXTH Article

disposes of "all articles of personal, household or domestic use
or adornment," with certain exceptions.

The THIRD Article of the

Will makes various devises of personal property and then grants a
power of appointment to two of the Testator's close friends and his
son to distribute "the remaining items of personal property." This
language may reasonably be construed to dispose of the residue of
s/scarritt/pldgs/appellee.gmh
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the Testator's personal property, including the real property
proceeds.

This construction is confirmed by: (l) the broad

definitions of the terms "personal property" and "items of .
personal property" contained in the Utah Code; (2) the numerous
provisions in the Will that are inconsistent with a claim of
intestacy; and (3) the Testator's use of different terms to refer
to various

types

of

personal

property.

Alternatively,

the

Testator's bequest of "all articles of personal, household, or
domestic use" in the SIXTH Article of the Will may reasonably be
construed to dispose of the personal property residue.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE WILL MUST BE CONSTRUED TO EFFECTUATE
THE TESTATOR'S INTENT.
The primary purpose of the Utah Uniform Probate Code is "to
discover

and

make

effective

distribution of his property."

the

intent

of

a

decedent

in

Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-102 (1953).

"The intention of a testator as expressed in his will controls the
legal effect of his dispositions."

Id. § 75-2-603. Thus, "[t]he

paramount objective in interpreting a will is to give effect to the
intent and desire of the testator . . . ."

In re Estate of

Wallich. 18 Utah 2d 240, 420 P.2d 40, 42 (1966).

In order to

determine the testator's intent, the will "should be read and
understood as a whole, and meaning given to all of its provisions
considered in their relationship to each other."

s/scarritt/pldgs/appetlee.gmh
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In re Estate of

Wallich. 420 P.2d at 42; see also In re Estate of Gardner. 615 P.2d
1215,

1217 (Utah 1980).
POINT II
PETITIONER MUST OVERCOME THE STRONG
PRESUMPTION AGAINST INTESTACY.
The Utah Uniform Probate Code establishes a strong presumption

that a testator, in making a will, intends to dispose of all of his
or her property and avoid intestacy in whole or in part:
A will is construed to pass all property
which the testator owns at his death including
property acquired after the execution of the
will.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-604 (1953) (emphasis added).

Those claiming

that a testator intended to die intestate bear the burden of
establishing that intent.

See Id. § 75-3-407.

In the case of In re Estate of Gardner, 615 P.2d 1215 (Utah
1980), this Court explained the practical, legal effect of the
presumption against intestacy:
Based on the presumption against intestacy,
the
court
will
adopt
any
reasonable
construction [of a will] to avoid a conclusion
of intestacy.
Id. at 1217 (emphasis added). Numerous other jurisdictions follow
the identical standard.

See, e.g.. Booth v. Krua. 368 111. 487,

14 N.E.2d 645, 649 (1938) ("The presumption against intestacy is
so strong that the court will adopt any reasonable construction to
avoid it"); Estate of Rose v. Loucks, 772 S.W.2d 886, 889 (Mo. Ct.

s/scarritt/pldgs/appellee.gmh
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App. 1989); Smith v. Estate of Peters, 741 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Alaska
1987).3
In this case, Petitioner claims that he is entitled to a
portion of the Testator's assets by way of intestate succession.
The Will effectively precludes Petitioner from making any claim
under the Will.

[Last Will and Testament, NINTH Article.]

See.

e

«q* / In re Estate of Jones. 759 P.2d 345, 348-50 (Utah Ct. App.

1988) (parent may intentionally omit child from will).

Since this

Court will adopt "any reasonable construction" of the Will to avoid
intestacy,

In re Estate

of Gardner.

615 P. 2d at

1217, and

Petitioner is claiming that the Testator died intestate as to most
of his property, Petitioner must establish that the only reasonable
construction of the Will results in intestacy.
POINT III
THE TESTATOR18 WILL DISPOSES OF ALL OF HIS REAL
PROPERTY UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE CONVERSION.
Petitioner claims that the Testator died completely intestate
as to his real property.

Petitioner argues that the Testator made

no provision in his Will for the disposition of real property and
that the SEVENTH Article of the Will recognizes that there would

3

The presumption against intestacy is so firmly established as
to be beyond dispute. See, e.g., Hoover v. Sims. 792 S.W.2d 171,
174 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) , writ denied; In re Estate of Bennett. 789
P.2d 446, 448 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989), cert, denied (Colo. 1990); New
Mexico Bovs' Ranch. Inc. v. Hanvev. 97 N.M. 771, 643 P.2d 857, 859
(1982); In re Estate of Ikuta. 64 Haw. 236, 639 P.2d 400, 406
(1981) ("The law abhors intestacy and presumes against it"); In re
Estate of Foster. 82 Nev. 97, 411 P.2d 482, 483 (1966); In re Trust
Estate of Weill. 48 Haw. 553, 406 P.2d 718, 724 (Haw. 1965).
s/scarritt/pldgs/appellee.gmh
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be real property left in the estate.
15.]

[Appellant's Brief, at 14-

These contentions must be rejected.
A.

The Will Mandates a Sale of the Testator's Real Property.

The Testator's directions concerning the disposition of his
real property are contained in Article SEVENTH of the Will.

The

Petitioner notably avoids quoting all of the pertinent language of
that section.

The SEVENTH Article provides:

I
hereby
direct
my
Personal
Representative to borrow monies against my
real property located in Virgin, Utah and to
pay whatever sums are necessary for the
maintenance, upkeep and preservation of my
ranch in Virgin, Utah and also the salaries of
my employees until such time as the ranch is
sold . . . . All monies borrowed against the
real property in Virgin, Utah are to be paid
back immediately upon the sale of said
property.
I
authorize
my
Personal
Representative to sell all real property,
together with all tangible personal property
and livestock included in my estate and not
effectively disposed of pursuant to Articles
THIRD and SIXTH hereof, at such time or times
and upon such terms and conditions as shall
seem advisable and to add the proceeds of any
such sale to my estate.
[Last Will and Testament, Article SEVENTH (emphasis added.)
This

language, when

read

in

full, clearly

Testator's intent that his real property be sold.

conveys the
The Testator

directs the Personal Representative to borrow money against the
real property for maintaining the Ranch "until such time as the
ranch is sold."

s/scarn*tt/pldgs/appellee.gmh
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repaid

"immediately upon the sale of said property."

These

provisions create a scheme which mandates the sale of the Ranch/
In addition, this interpretation is the only construction of
the Will that is consistent with the other provisions of the Will.
The SECOND Article of the Will directs the personal representative
to pay all of the Testator's "just debts, funeral expenses, and
expenses of [his] last illness . . . ." The FIFTH Article of the
Will further provides that "any inheritance, succession, estate,
transfer, legacy or duty or tax which shall become payable . . .
in respect to any property or interest passing under this [Will]
. . . shall be paid out of or charged against my Utah estate in the
manner hereinabove provided, as if it were a debt and without
apportionment."

(Emphasis added.)

It is undisputed that the Testator's estate lacks sufficient
assets for the payment of his debts, the estate taxes, the costs
of administration, and the costs of maintaining the Ranch, while
at the same time satisfying the specific bequests made in the Will.
The only possible way to effectuate the Testator's intent with
respect to all of these provisions is to sell the Ranch and use the
proceeds for the payment of these costs and expenses.

Since the

Testator is presumed to have been aware of the nature and extent

4

This construction of the SEVENTH Article is consistent with
the pattern set by the Testator in the SECOND Article of the Will.
The SECOND Article states: "I hereby direct [payment] of all my
just debts . . . ." It then provides authorization: "I hereby
authorize and empower my executor . . . to settle and discharge
[claims made against the estate]." The SEVENTH Article of the Will
also begins with the command, "I hereby direct," and follows with
the requisite authorization.
s/scarritt/ptdgs/appetlee.gmh
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of his estate, and the fact that his assets were insufficient to
carry out his objectives without a sale of the real property, see
In re Suppesf Estate, 185 A. 616, 617 (Pa. 1936), the inescapable
conclusion is that the Testator intended his real property to be
sold to accomplish his purposes.
The THIRD Article of the Will also confirms this construction
of the Will.

It states that "All the rest residue, and remainder

of my estate, both real and personal, of whatsoever kind and nature
and wheresoever the same may be situated of which I shall die
seized or possess to which in any way I may be entitled at the time
of my death . . . , I give, devise, and bequeath as follows . . .
.tf

(Emphasis added.)

This language clearly

expresses the

Testator's intent to dispose of all his assets under the Will,
including his real property.

The fact that the subsections of

Article THIRD do not mention real property only confirms the fact
that the Testator understood and intended that his real property
would be sold pursuant to the SEVENTH Article of the Will.5
5

The presumption against intestacy is so strong that courts in
some instances have even construed the term "personal property" to
include a decedent's real property.
See, e.g., Davisson v.
Sparrow. 97 N.E.2d 694, 695 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949); Gilkev v.
Chambers, 146 Tex. 355, 207 S.W.2d 70, 73 (1947); In re Estate of
Olsen, 9 Cal. App. 2d 374, 50 P.2d 70, 73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1935).
These courts simply interpret the term "personal property" to mean
property which the testator owned "personally." See id.
In this case, the decedent made a devise in the THIRD Section
of the Will of his "remaining items of personal property." [Will,
Article THIRD, E.2.]
The opening paragraph of that Section
devises "All the rest, residue, and remainder of [decedent's]
estate, both real and personal, of whatsoever kind and nature and
wheresoever . . . situated . . . ." In light of this language, and
the strong presumption against intestacy, the Court could conclude
that the decedent's real property passes under the THIRD Section
of the Will.
s/scarn" tt/pldgs/appe11ee. gmh
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Despite these clear manifestations of the Testator1 intent,
Petitioner claims that

,f

[t]he Will contains a provision dealing

with real estate which is consistent with its [purported] failure
to dispose of any real property."

[Appellant's Brief, at 14.]

Petitioner argues that "the SEVENTH Article of the Will is an
authorization for the personal representative to 'sell all real
property" included in the estate

f

not effectively disposed of

pursuant to Articles THIRD and SIXTH hereof
(Emphasis Petitioner's).]

. . . ."

[id.

Petitioner contends that this language

"specifically recognizes" that real property would remain in the
estate after the dispositions made in Articles THIRD and SIXTH.

This argument does not withstand even the most rudimentary
textual analysis. The provision in question, which Petitioner only
partially quotes, reads as follows:
I authorize my Personal Representative to sell
all real property, together with all tangible
personal property and livestock included in my
estate and not effectively disposed of
pursuant to Articles THIRD and SIXTH hereof,
at such time or times and upon such terms and
conditions as shall seem advisable and to add
the proceeds of any such sale to my estate.
[Last Will and Testament, Article SEVENTH (emphasis added).]

The

structure and punctuation of this sentence clearly demonstrates
that the clause "included in my estate and not effectively disposed
of pursuant to Articles THIRD and SIXTH hereof" does not apply to
the term

"real property" but applies only to the Testator's

"tangible personal property."

This language, therefore, does not

indicate that there would be real property remaining in the
s/scarritt/pldgs/appellee.gmh
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Testator's estate after all distributions are made.

It merely

recognizes that some of the Testator's "tangible personal property"
may not be distributed in kind under the THIRD and SIXTH Articles
of the Will and should, therefore, be sold and distributed as
money.6
To the extent that Petitioner is attempting to create an
ambiguity in the SEVENTH Article of the Will, Utah law provides two
means of resolving the dispute.

First, the presumption against

intestacy obliges the Court to adopt "any reasonable construction"
of the Will that "avoid[s] a conclusion of intestacy."

In re

Estate of Gardner, 615 P. 2d at 1217; see Utah Code Ann. § 75-2604 (1953).

In light of the other provisions of the Will, the

Personal Representative's construction of the SEVENTH Article not
only provides a reasonable construction of the Will, it is the only
reasonable construction.

Second, to the extent that the SEVENTH

Article of the Will is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence is admissible
to show the Testator's intent. See Estate of Ashton v. Ashton, 804
P.2d 540, 542-43 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Godfrey v. Chandlev, 248
Kan. 975, 811 P.2d 1248, 1251 (1991).

The extrinsic evidence in

this case indicates that the Testator intended his Ranch to be sold
and the proceeds to be used to pay his debts, the estate taxes, and
furthermore, the Testator's reference in the SEVENTH Article
to "any such sale" does not indicate that a sale of the Ranch is
discretionary. That same sentence of Article SEVENTH also refers
to a sale of any "tangible personal property" not effectively
disposed of under the THIRD and SIXTH Articles of the Will. Since
a sale of "tangible personal property" was not inevitable (it could
all be distributed in kind under Articles THIRD and SIXTH) it was
perfectly consistent for the Testator to refer to "any such sale"
of that property.
s/scarritt/pldgs/appellee.gmh
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the expenses of administration.
R. 86.]

[Affidavit of James M. Park J 12,

The SEVENTH Article of the Will must, therefore, be

construed as a mandate that the Personal Representative sell the
Testator's real property.
B.

The Will Converts the Testator's Real Property into
Personalty under the Doctrine of Equitable Conversion.

Petitioner next contends that the Will does not convert the
Testator's real property into personal property for purposes of
distribution.
that

the

equitable

[Appellant's Brief, at 16.]

District

Court

conversion

improperly

in concluding

Petitioner maintains

invoked
that

the

doctrine of

the Testator's

property passed under the Will as personal property.

real

Petitioner

advances three arguments to avoid application of that doctrine in
this case: (1) the doctrine of equitable conversion by will is not
the law in Utah; (2) equitable conversion does not apply unless a
will contains a mandatory direction to sell real property; and (3)
any discretion with respect to the sale of the real property
prevents application of the doctrine.
18.]

[Appellant's Brief, at 16-

These contentions must be rejected.
1.

The doctrine of equitable conversion provides the
rule of decision in this case.

The doctrine of "[e]quitable conversion is generally defined
as that change in the nature of property by which, for certain
purposes, real estate is considered as personalty or personalty is
considered as realty and the property is transmissible as so
considered."

Parson v. Wolfe, 676 S.W.2d 689, 691 (Tex. Ct. App.

1984). (emphasis added); see, e.g., Holzhauser v. Iowa State Tax
s/scarritt/pldgs/appellee.gmh
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Comm'n. 62 N.W.2d 229, 232 (Iowa 1953); In re Livingston's Estate.
9 P.2d 159, 163 (Mont- 1932); Citizens1 Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l
Bank, 222 P. 935, 937 (N.M. 1924).

As the court explained in

Lampman v. Sledge, 502 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973):
The most common case of equitable conversion
occurs where the provisions of a will
expressly or impliedly direct that the
testator's real property be sold and the
proceeds distributed. In contemplation of law
the realty will be deemed sold as of the date
of the death of the testator, and for the
purpose of distribution will be treated as
personalty and not as land.
Id. at 959.
The effects of this rule are binding upon the courts and all
persons concerned with the property:
[T]he doctrine of equitable conversion is a
rule of necessity, not of convenience. It is
a rule of necessity in the sense that, when a
person has exercised a power over his
property, as he has a right to do, by will or
deed, the change in the character of the
property which he has directed becomes binding
upon all persons thereafter concerned with the
same.
Citizens' Nat'l Bank, 222 P. at 940.
Petitioner correctly points out that there are no reported
Utah cases applying the doctrine of equitable conversion by will.
That fact, however, does not mean that the doctrine of equitable
conversion by will is inapplicable in Utah. Section 68-3-1 of the
Utah Code provides:

Petitioner concedes, of course, that this Court has applied
the doctrine of equitable conversion by contract.
[Appellant's
Brief, at 16.]
s/scarritt/pldgs/appeUee.gmh
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The common law of England so far as it is
[consistent with federal and state law and
policy] is hereby adopted, and shall be the
rule of decision in all courts of this state.
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-1 (1953) (emphasis added).
This Court has explained that Section 68-3-1 adopts the
common law of England as it has been adopted and expounded by the
courts of last resort of this country.

Cahoon v. Pelton. 9 Utah

2d 224, 342 P.2d 94, 98 (1959); see also State v. c.R.. 797 P.2d
459, 463 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

The term "common law" is broadly

defined as that great body of non-statutory or unwritten law which
is founded on custom and usage and in which the courts have long
acquiesced.

15A Am. Jur. 2d, Common Law § l (1976) ; see, e.g..

Windust v. Department of Labor & Indus.. 52 Wash. 2d 33, 323 P.2d
241, 243 (1958) .
Equitable conversion by will fully satisfies the requirements
of Section 68-3-1.

The doctrine was first developed in the courts

of England over three hundred years ago.
691.

Parson. 676 S.W.2d at

It has since been adopted and expounded by an overwhelming

majority of courts in this country.8 While this Court has not yet
The doctrine of equitable conversion by will is so firmly
rooted in the common law of this country as to be beyond dispute.
See, e.g.. Parson. 676 S.W.2d at 691 (Texas); Dinkins v. Convers.
382 So.2d 1129, 1131 (Ala. 1980); Atkinson v. Van Echaute. 366
S.W.2d 273, 274 (Ark. 1963); Holzhauser. 62 N.W.2d at 232 (Iowa);
Kikel v. Kikel. 372 Pa. 200, 93 A.2d 443, 445 (1953); Wollard v.
Sulier. 55 N.M. 326, 232 P.2d 991, 994 (1951); Elmore v. Austin.
232 N.C. 13, 59 S.E.2d 205, 213 (1950); Kuiken v. Simonds. 3 N.J.
480, 70 A.2d 740, 743 (1950); Zulver Realty Co.. Inc. v. Snvder.
62 A.2d 276, 279 (Md. Ct. App. 1948); In re Ellertson's Estate. 157
Kan. 492, 142 P.2d 724, 729 (1943); Hahn v. Verret. 11 N.W.2d 551,
559 (Neb. 1943); In re Livingston's Estate. 9 P.2d at 159 (Mont.);
Trotter v. Van Pelt. 198 So. 215, 218 (Fla. 1940); John v. Turner.
6 S.E.2d 480, 482 (W. Va. 1939); In re Rowland's Estate. 273 N.Y.
s/scarritt/pldgs/appellee, gmh

-20-

had occasion to address equitable conversion by will, the Court has
recognized the doctrine of equitable conversion by contract. See,
e.a.- Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 1255 (Utah 1987).

As

will be shown below, the doctrine of equitable conversion by will
is completely consistent with Utah law and policy.

The doctrine

of equitable conversion by will is, therefore, the law of this
State and provides the rule of decision in this case.

See Utah

Code Ann. § 68-3-1 (1953); Cahoon, 342 P.2d at 98.
2.

A will need not contain a mandatory instruction to
sell in order to cause an equitable conversion.

Petitioner quotes several general statements from various
secondary sources to argue that "if a will does not contain a
mandatory instruction to sell the real estate, the real estate
cannot be converted and pass as personal property."
Brief, at 17.] 9

[Appellant's

Petitioner fails to note, however, that the

100, 6 N.E.2d 393, 395 (1937); Reynold's Executor v. Reynolds. 218
S.W. 1001, 1003 (Ky Ct. App. 1920); In re Stephenson's Estate, 177
N.W. 579, 583 (Wis. 1920); Grove v. Willard, 280 111. 247, 117 N.E.
489, 492 (1917); Greenman v. McVev. 126 Minn. 21, 147 N.W. 812,
813-14 (1914); Martin v. Preston, 94 P. 1087, 1089 (Wash. 1908);
In re Pforr's Estate, 77 P. 825, 827 (Cal. 1904). Many of these
jurisdictions have adopted the Uniform Probate Code, as has Utah.
See 8 Uniform Laws Annotated, Estate, Probate and Related Laws, at
1 (1983 & Supp. 1991).
Petitioner attempts to bolster this argument by contending
that equitable conversion by contract under Utah law applies only
when the duty to sell is "absolute." That statement is inaccurate.
An earnest money agreement, for example, effects an equitable
conversion of real property even though the agreement is subject
to conditions. Lach v. Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987); see also Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 1255 (Utah
1987) ("The vendor's retention of legal title is usually coupled
with a contract right to forfeit the vendee's interest and to take
back the vendee's interests if the vendee defaults").
In any event, equitable conversion by will and equitable
conversion by contract rest on different grounds. See Parson, 676
s/scarritt/pldgs/appellee.gmh

-21-

secondary sources on which he relies explain that a testator's
direction to sell real property "may be express or implied," 27 Am.
Jur

-

2d, Equitable Conversion § 5, at 487 (1966), and that the

power of sale conferred by a will need not be "in terms imperative"
in order to work an equitable conversion.

Id. § 7, at 491.10

The

Petitioner's claim that a will must contain an express command to
sell real property in order to cause an equitable conversion must,
therefore, be rejected.

Cases applying the doctrine of equitable

conversion confirm this conclusion.
The "sole purpose of the doctrine [of equitable conversion]
in the case of a will is to effectuate [the] testator's intent."
McCaughna v. Bilhorn, 10 Cal. App. 2d 674, 52 P.2d 1025, 1928
(1935); accord Funk v. Funk, 563 N.E.2d 127, 129 (Ind. Ct. App.

S.W.2d at 691 n.2 (quoting Simpson, Legislative Changes in the Law
of Equitable Conversion by Contract, 44 Yale L.J. 559, 561 n.10
(1935) (equitable conversion by will "depends on the intention of
the testator," whereas equitable conversion by contract is based
upon "rules of law as to consequences of the right to specific
performance of a land contract").
10

Since a direction to sell [real property]
need not be express in order for it to be
imperative, and it can be implied in a proper
case, if a testator authorizes his executors
to sell his real estate and it is apparent from
the general provisions of the will that it was
his intention that the power to sell so
conferred by him should be exercised, such
power will be construed as a direction to sell
and will operate as an equitable conversion,
although it is not in terms imperative.

27 Am. Jur. 2d Equitable Conversion § 7, at 491 (1966) (footnotes
omitted) (emphasis added); see also Page, Page on Wills^ § 46.3
(stating that a power of sale which "may be exercised entirely at
the discretion of the executors or trustees, does not, of itself,
work a conversion").
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1990); Parson, 676 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); Citizen's Natfl
Bank, 222 P. at 937-38 •
that

equity

regards

The doctrine "is grounded on the maxim

as done

conscience should be done."

that which

in

fairness

and good

Parson, 676 S.W..2d at 691; accord

Wollard v. Sulier, 55 N.M. 326, 232 P.2d 991, 994 (1951); Kuiken
v. Simonds, 3 N.J. 480, 70 A.2d 740, 743 (1949).

The testator's

intent is, therefore, "of paramount and controlling importance" in
determining whether a will converts real property to personalty.
Wollard, 232 P.2d at 994 (quoting Citizens1 Nat'l Bank, 222 P. at
937);

accord Atkinson v. Van Echaute, 366 S.W.2d 273, 274 (Ark.

1963)

("Intent is the determining

factor"); In re Ellertson's

Estate, 157 Kan. 492, 142 P.2d 724, 729 (1943); McCaughna, 52 P.2d
at 1025; In re Edwards' Estate, 168 Pa. Super. 471, 79 A.2d 138,
140 (1951); Trotter v. Van Pelt, 198 So. 215, 218 (Fla. 1940);
Talbott v. Compher, 110 A. 100, 101 (Md. Ct. App. 1920); Grove v.
Willard, 280 111. 247, 117 N.E. 489, 492 (1917).
A testator's intent to convert real property into personal
property may be shown in three different ways:
direction

to

sell,

(2) an

implied

direction

(1) a positive

to sell, or

(3)

necessity to sell in order to carry out the provisions of the will.
See, e.g. , Wollard, 232 P.2d at 994-95; McCaughna, 52 P.2d at 1028;
Citizens' Nat'l Bank, 222 P. at 938; Martin v. Preston, 94 P. 1087,
1089

(Wash. 1908); In re Pforr's Estate, 77 P. 825, 827 (Cal.

1904); Lampman, 502 S.W.2d at 959; Zulver Realty Co., Inc. v.
Snyder, 62 A.2d 276, 279 (Md. Ct. App. 1948); Hahn v. Verret, 11
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N.W.2d 551, 559 (Neb, 1943); In re Stephenson's Estate. 177 N.W.
579,

583 (Wis. 1920); Grove, 117 N.E. at 492.
An implied direction to sell arises when consideration of the

entire will shows that the testator intended his or her real
property to be sold, even though the will simply authorizes rather
than commands a sale of the real property:
[T]he inquiry is always as to the
intention of the testator. It is not so much
the words that he employs as it is his
intention
as
derived
from
the
entire
instrument. The whole theory of conversion
rests upon the intention of the testator.
That is the great guide in determining whether
there has been an equitable conversion of
realty into personalty. There have been many
cases where there was no express direction to
sell, but where it was apparent from the
general provisions of the will that the
testator intended the real estate to be sold.
In these cases it has been universally held
that a direction would be implied, and an
equitable conversion worked.
Greenman v. McVev, 126 Minn. 21, 147 N.W. 812, 813-14 (1914);
accord McCaughna, 52 P.2d at 1028; Citizens' Natfl Bank, 222 P. at
938; In re Pforr's Estate, 77 P. at 827; see also Martin, 94 P. at
1089;

Hahn, 11 N.W.2d at 559.
A testator's direction to sell arises by necessity where the

personal representative is authorized to sell real property and a
sale is necessary in order to carry out the provisions of the will:
[W]here the provisions of a will cannot be
carried out without converting the realty into
personalty, and the conditions are such that
the testator must have contemplated that such
conversion would take place to that end,
courts of equity deal with the estate as
personal property from the time the will takes
effect—from the death of the testator.
s/scarritt/pldgs/appellee.gmh

-24

Hahn, 11 N.W.2d at 559; accord Citizens' Natfl Bank, 222 P. at 938;
In re Bondv's Estate, 118 N.Y.S.2d 93, 96 (Sur. Ct. 1952); In re
Stephenson's Estate, 177 N.W. at 583; Greenman. 147 N.W. at 814.
This condition occurs most frequently when the testator has not
otherwise provided sufficient assets for the payment of debts,
taxes, and/or expenses of administration.

See, e.g., Wollard, 232

P.2d at 994; In re Edwards' Estate, 79 A.2d at 140; Zulver Realty
Co. , 62 A.2d at 279; Hahn, 11 N.W.2d at 560; Camden Trust Co. .v
Haldeman, 33 A.2d 611, 614 (N.J. Ch. 1943), aff'd, 40 A.2d 601
(N.J. 1945).
When a direction to sell real property is implied from the
testator's intent or established by necessity, the duty to sell
becomes as mandatory as if it had been expressly commanded:
When the direction to convert is apparent from
the whole will, whether expressed or implied,
the duty and obligation to convert are
imperative.
Grove, 117 N.E. at 492; accord Citizens1 Nat'l Bank, 222 P. at 938
("This implied

intention

. . . becomes as mandatory on the

executors and trustees, and as effectual to work conversion as if
so expressed in the will11); Greenman, 147 N.W. at 814; see also
McCaughna, 52 P. 2d at 1028 ("While the desire of a testator for the
disposal of his estate is a mere request when addressed to his
devisee, it is to be construed as a command when addressed to his
executor").

An implied duty to sell, therefore, fully satisfies

the purported requirement that the duty to sell must be "mandatory"
or "absolute" in order to work an equitable conversion. See, e.g. ,
Greenman, 147 N.W. at 813-14.
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3.
Petitioner

Discretion as to the time, terms, and manner of sale
does not defeat equitable conversion.
also

implies

that

the doctrine

of

equitable

conversion cannot be applied if the personal representative has any
discretion regarding the sale of the testator's real property.
[Appellant's Brief, at 17.]

That implication is erroneous.

The

fact that a personal representative "is vested with some discretion
as to the time, terms, and manner of sale does not militate against
the doctrine of equitable conversion."

Trotter. 198 So. at 218;

accord In re Livingston's Estate. 9 P.2d at 163; In re Myers'
Estate. 234 Iowa 502, 12 N.W.2d 211, 213 (1943); Talbott. 110 A.
at 102); Grove, 117 N.E. at 492.
to defeat the testator's intent.
4.

To conclude otherwise would be
See id.

This Court should reject the rigid, mechanical
approach advanced by Petitioner.

The flexible approach described above is completely consistent
with, and actively promotes, the policies and purposes of the Utah
Uniform Probate Code. The main purpose of the Utah Uniform Probate
Code is "to discover and make effective the intent of a decedent's
in distribution of his [or her] property."

Utah Code Ann. § 75-

1-102 (1953); see also In re Estate of Wallich. 420 P.2d at 42.
The "sole purpose" of the doctrine of equitable conversion is to
effectuate the decedent's intent.

McCaughna, 52 P.2d at 1028.

Under Utah law, the testator's intent, as expressed in his or her
will, controls the legal effect of his or her dispositions. Utah
Code Ann. § 75-2-603 (1953).

Under the doctrine of equitable

conversion, the testator's intent, as expressed in his or her will,
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is of "paramount and controlling importance."
at 994.

Wollard, 232 P.2d

These principles, therefore, confirm and complement each

other.
This Court has also indicated that a will should be examined
in its entirety, "and meaning given to all of its provisions
considered

in their relationship to each other," in order to

determine the testator's intent. In re Estate of Wallich, 42 0 P. 2d
at 42. A flexible approach to equitable conversion advances this
policy, because it permits and encourages the court to determine
the testator's intent by examining the entirety of the will, see
In re Livingston's Estate, 9 P.2d at 163, rather than by focusing
on one or two isolated phrases.

As the court stated in Kikel v.

KiJcel, 372 Pa. 200, 93 A.2d 443, 445 (1953):
[Q]uestions [concerning equitable conversion]
cannot be decided by rigid mechanical
application of any formula but require in each
case a determination of the intention of the
testator as revealed in his will.
Kikel, 93 A. 2d at 445. A flexible approach to equitable conversion
is also consistent with the presumption against intestacy.

See

Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-604 (1953); Greenman, 147 N.W. at 814.
In contrast, the approach advanced by Petitioner would require
that a will contain an express command to sell in order to effect
an equitable conversion.

[See Appellant's Brief, at 16-17.] This

rigid, mechanical approach is fundamentally inconsistent with Utah
law and policy. See Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-102 (1953) ; In re Estate
of Wallich, 420 P.2d at 42. Such an approach would condition the
effect of a testator's dispositions on an incantation of key words
— 97 —
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and phrases, rather than on the testator's intent as shown by the
entirety of the will.

It would defeat the testator's intent in

every instance where the will manifests a clear implied intent that
the real property be sold but does not contain an express command
to sell.

It would also defeat the testator's intent in every

instance where a sale of real property is necessary to carry out
the testator's testamentary plan, but the will contains no express
command to sell.
The Petitioner's approach would also discriminate against
those who are compelled or choose to draft their own wills, see,
e.g.. Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-503 (1953) (validating holographic
wills), since many such individuals would be unlikely to know the
formal requirements for equitable conversion.

In addition, the

Petitioner's suggested approach contradicts the strong statutory
presumption against intestacy.

See Id. § 75-2-604.

For all of

these reasons, this Court should reject the rigid, mechanical
approach advocated by Petitioner.
5.

The Testatorfs
personalty.

See Kikel, 93 A.2d at 445.

Will

converts

his

realty

into

In this case, the Testator's Will effects an equitable
conversion of the Ranch into personal property, because it is clear
from the entirety of the Will that the Testator intended his Ranch
to be sold.
implied

See, e.g., McCaughna, 52 P.2d at 1028 (direction

from testator's

intent).

The Will also effects an

equitable conversion of the Ranch by necessity, in order to carry
out the provision of the Will.

It would be impossible to satisfy

all of the Testator's debts, the estate taxes, and the costs of
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administration, while at the same time satisfying all of the
specific bequests made in the Will, without selling the Ranch.
See, e.g., Wollard, 232 P. 2d at 994 (necessity).

The District

Court, therefore, correctly treated the Testator's real property
as personalty under the doctrine of equitable conversion.
Other courts have reached the same conclusion in similar
cases.

In Read v. Maryland General Hospital, 146 A. 742 (Md. Ct.

App. 1929) , the court addressed the issue of whether the proceeds
from the sale of the testator's real property passed to the her
residual

personal

intestacy.

property

Id. at 74 3.

beneficiary

or

to

her

heirs

in

The decedent's will stated:

I hereby authorize and empower my executor .
. . to sell all my real estate, either at
public or private sale, in parcels, lots, or
in its entirety, . . . as in his discretion he
may deem proper for the best interest of my
estate, and make distribution of the proceeds
derived therefrom in conformity with [my
will].
Id. (emphasis added) . Just as the Petitioner argues in this case,
the heirs in Read argued that because the will only "authorize[d]
and empower [ed]"

rather than commanded the executor to sell the

real property, the will did not work an equitable conversion. Id.
The

court

rejected

this

argument, concluding

that

the will

"manifest[ed] a clear intention" that the testator's real property
"be converted into money."

Id. The court granted the proceeds of

sale to the personal property beneficiary.

See id.

In Fahnestock v. Fahnestock, 25 A. 313 (Pa. 1892), the court
construed a will which stated: "I hereby empower and authorize my
executors to sell all my real estate . . . ."
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Id^. The testator

subsequently stated that

ff

[a]ll the rest and residue of my estate

(real and personal) I give, devise, and bequeath as follows . . .
."

Id. at 314. One of the beneficiaries of the residuary clause

brought suit to partition the testator's real property.

Id.

The

court rejected the request for partition, concluding that the
doctrine of equitable conversion applied:
It is apparent on the face of the will that
the testator intended his property, real and
personal, should be converted into money, for
distribution, investment, and the collection
and payment of interest or income as he had
directed.
Id. at 315.
In In re Suppes1 Estate, 185 A. 616 (Pa. 1936), the testator's
will authorized the sale of her real property but did not contain
an express direction to sell.

Id. at 617. The will directed that

the testator's debts, the costs of "all repairs and taxes necessary
to keep up the homestead, as well as the living expenses of the
family, be paid 'out of my estate."1

Id. The testator's personal

property, however, had been "specifically bequeathed."
testator's

"residuary

estate, real, personal

divided" between five individuals.
beneficiaries
property.

brought

Id. at 616.

suit

Id.

The

and mixed, was

One of the five residuary

to partition

the testator's

real

The other residuary beneficiaries opposed

this action, contending that the proceeds of the testator's real
property became personal property under the doctrine of equitable
conversion and were to be used for the payment of the testator's
debts, the costs of maintaining the homestead, and the family's
living expenses.
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The court rejected the petition for partition, concluding that
the real estate had been converted to personalty by necessary
implication.

Id. at 617. The court explained:

The testatrix is presumed to have been aware
of the nature of her estate and of the fact
that her personal property was entirely
insufficient to raise an income sufficient for
the [above-enumerated] purposes. She must,
therefore, have intended a conversion to carry
out these provisions. It would be impossible
to pay the decedent's debts, keep up repairs,
pay taxes and the living expenses of her
family, and carry out the instructions with
relation to the children without a sale of the
real estate.
Id.

The Testator in this case is similarly presumed to have been

aware that his estate would be insufficient, without the sale of
the Ranch, to accomplish his purposes.
In the case of In re Edwards1 Estate, 168 Pa. Super. 471, 79
A.2d 138 (1951), the court addressed the issue of whether proceeds
from the sale of the testator's real property passed under the will
or by way of intestacy.

79 A.2d at 139. The testator owned three

parcels of real estate at her death, but her personal property was
insufficient to pay her debts and various cash bequests. Id.

The

testator's will contained a passing reference to the sale of one
of the parcels of real property

but otherwise contained no

direction or authorization to sell.

Id. at 140.

The court discussed the rule of equitable conversion by
necessity and concluded that it applied because "the personal
property of testatrix was entirely insufficient to pay debts and
legacies."

Id.

The court concluded that any proceeds remaining

after the payment of the testator's debts and bequests would pass
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under the will as "cash," rather than to her heir in intestacy.
Id. at 139-40; see also Wollard. 232 P.2d at 991 (the proceeds of
the decedent's real property were converted to personalty and
provided "the primary fund for the payment of debts, expenses, and
inheritance taxes"); Fahnestock, 25 A. at 315 (equitable conversion
applied because it "was not possible to execute certain provisions
. • . of the will without a conversion of the real estate . . .
into money).
Lastly, even under the rigid, mechanical approach advanced by
Petitioner, the Will converts the Testator's real property into
personal property. As shown above, the SEVENTH Article of the Will
creates a scheme which includes language of command and mandates
a sale of the property.

The Testator's real property was,

therefore, converted to personalty.
C.

The Will Disposes of the Real Property Proceeds.

Petitioner's final argument concerning the real property is
that the Will does not dispose of the Ranch proceeds.

Petitioner

contends that the Testatorfs direction in Article SEVENTH of the
Will to add the Ranch proceeds "to my estate" must be construed to
mean that the Personal Representative must add the proceeds to the
Testator's estate in intestacy.

Petitioner notes that the term

"estate" could be construed to mean "all the decedent's property,
whether passing by will, by trust, or by intestacy."

[Appellant's

Brief, at 19.] This argument should be rejected for at least four
compelling reasons.
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First, Petitioner's argument simply begs the question, since
there can be no estate in intestacy unless the Will fails to
dispose

of

the

residue

of

the

Testator's

personal

property.

Second, the phrase "add the proceeds . . . to my estate" must be
construed, if at all possible, to avoid intestacy.

In re Estate

of Gardner. 615 P.2d at 1217; see Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-604 (1953).
The most reasonable construction of that language is that the
proceeds should be added to the Testator's estate for use and
distribution

under

the Will.

Third, to the extent

that the

language is ambiguous, the extrinsic evidence establishes that the
Testator intended the proceeds to be used for payment of debts,
estate taxes, and other expenses, with the residue passing under
the Will.

[Affidavit of James M. Park, J 5, R. 84.]

Finally, the

cases applying the doctrine of equitable conversion indicate that
converted

proceeds

pass

according

personal property distribution.

to

the

testator's

plan

of

See, e.g., Read, 146 A. at 743

(proceeds pass to personal property beneficiaries, not to heirs);
In re Edwards' Estate. 79 A.2d at 139-40 (same).
For

all

of

these

reasons, the

District

Court

correctly

concluded that the Testator died testate as to all of his real
property.

The real property must be sold and, by virtue of the

doctrine of equitable conversion, the proceeds must be treated as
personalty for use and distribution under the Will.
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POINT IV
THE WILL DISPOSES OF ALL OF THE TESTATOR»S PERSONAL PROPERTY.
Petitioner claims that the Testator died partially intestate
as to his personal property for three reasons: (1) the Will
contains no clause disposing of the Testator's personal property
residue; (2) the SEVENTH Article of the Will recognizes the limited
scope

of

Articles

THIRD

and

SIXTH;

and

(3) the

manner

of

disposition under Article THIRD, subparagraph E. 2 . "is inconsistent
with disposition of the bulk of the estate."
at 2 0-2 6.]
A*

[Appellant's Brief,

These arguments should be rejected.
The Relevant Standards of Interpretation Require a Broad
Construction of the Will's Personal Property Provisions.

The personal property provisions of the Will must be construed
broadly, consistent with the relevant standards of interpretation.
1.

The Utah Code provides a broad definition of the
term "personal property."

The Utah Uniform Probate Code defines the term "property" very
broadly: "'Property1 includes both real and personal property or
any interest therein and means anything that may be the subject of
ownership." Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-201(33) (Supp. 1991).

The Utah

Code also supplies a broad definition of the term "personal
property:"
"Personal property" includes every description
of money, goods, chattels, effects, evidences of
rights in action, and all written instruments by
which any pecuniary obligation, right, or title to
property is created, acknowledged, transferred,
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increased, defeated, discharged, or diminished, and
every right or interest therein.
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12 (2) (m)

(Supp. 1991).

The dispositive

provisions of the Will dealing with "personal property" must,
therefore, be construed broadly in light of this definition.
2.

The personal property provisions must be construed
so far as possible to avoid intestacy.

The strong statutory presumption against intestacy requires
the Court to adopt "any reasonable construction [of the Will] so
as to avoid a conclusion of intestacy•"

In re Estate of Gardner.

615 P.2d at 1217; see Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-604 (1953).

The

presumption is particularly strong when the testator has employed
language resembling a residuary clause. See, e.g.. North Carolina
Nat'l Bank v. Apple, 95 N.C. App. 606, 383 S.E.2d 438, 440 (1989);
Estate of Rose, 772 S.W.2d at 889; In re Estate of Shaw, 182 111.
App.

3d 847, 538 N.E.2d 643, 645 (1989).

No particular words are

necessary to create a residuary clause.

See, e.g., In re Agius1

Will, 174 N.Y.S.2d 550, 552 (Sur. Ct. 1958).
3.

The testator9s use of different terms signifies
different meanings.

There is a strong presumption that when a testator uses
different terms, "a different meaning must have been intended."
Davisson v. Sparrow, 97 N.E.2d 694, 695 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949).
Thus, ff[i]f different words are employed with reference to a given
subject matter, it will be assumed that the testator intended a
different meaning when he employed such different expressions."
Id.
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B.

The THIRD and SIXTH Articles of the Will Dispose of All
of the Testator's Personal Property.

The THIRD and SIXTH Articles of the Will are the main
dispositive provisions of the Will.

The SIXTH Article devises to

Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr. "all articles of personal, household or
domestic use or adornment," with certain exceptions. This language
ostensibly relates to the Testator's personal effects and to the
tangible personal property associated with his home.

The only

exceptions noted are those relating to the personal property
associated with the Testator's business and the specific items of
personal property distributed in kind under the THIRD Article of
the Will.
The THIRD Article of the Will begins with a clear and
unmistakable expression of the Testator's intent to dispose of all
of his personal property.

That Article provides:

All the rest, residue, and remainder of my
estate, both real and personal, of whatsoever
kind and nature and wheresoever the same may
be situated of which I shall die seized or
possess to which in any way I may be entitled
at the time of my death [except the Horace S.
Scarritt Trust], I give, devise, and bequeath
as follows: . . . .
The Testator then makes specific personal property devises in
subsections A through E.l. of Article THIRD. Subsection E.2. then
provides a mechanism for disposition of the "remaining items" of
the Testator's "personal property:"
The distribution of the remaining items of personal
property should be determined by Curtiss S.
Scarritt, Jr., Rodney K. Orton and James M. Park.
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(Emphasis added.)

The District Court concluded from a review of

the entire will that this section created a valid power of
appointment in the named individuals, to dispose of the residue of
the Testator's personal property.

[Order of Formal Probate,

Conclusions, 5 11, R. 35.] This Court has held that no particular
words are necessary to create a power of appointment, In re Estate
of Lewis, 738 P.2d 617, 619-20 (Utah 1987), and Petitioner has not
challenged the District Court's conclusion that Article THIRD,
subsection E.2., created a valid power of appointment.
The preamble to Article THIRD and the entirety of the Will
demonstrate that the District Court reasonably concluded that the
Testator intended the phrase "remaining items of personal property"
as a residuary clause to pass all of the Testator's personal
property residue.

This construction is consistent with the broad

definition of "personal property" provided by the Utah Code.
The Utah Uniform Probate Code contains another provision which
strongly supports the District Court's construction of the term
"remaining items of personal property." Section 75-2-513 provides:
[A] will may refer to a written statement of list
to dispose of items of . . . personal property not
otherwise specifically disposed of by the will,
other than money, evidences of indebtedness,
documents of title, and securities, and property
used in trade or business.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-513 (1953).

This provision includes within

the term "items . . . of personal property," both "money" and its
equivalents.11

The Testator's use of the term "remaining items of

11

Otherwise, this section would not have had to exclude those
types of personal property from the scope of this provision.
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personal property" should thus be construed as including all of the
"remainder"

(residue), of the Testator's

"personal property,"

including the proceeds from the sale of his real property and any
remaining

"tangible personal property," as referenced

in the

SEVENTH Article of the Will.
The statutory presumption against intestacy also requires the
Court to give the "broadest meaning practicable" to the terms
"personal property" and "remaining items of personal property,"12
in order to avoid intestacy.

Quick v. Owens. 198 S.C. 29, 15

S.E.2d 837, 845 (1941); see Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-604 (1953); In
re Estate of Gardner, 615 P. 2d at 1217. For example, in Barnes v.
Evans, 102 N.C. App. 428, 402 S.E.2d 164 (N.C. 1991), aff'd.
S.E.2d

(N.C. 1992), the court construed the phrase "remaining

cash and bonds" broadly to include "certificates of deposit." 402
S.E.2d at 165-66.

The court based its conclusion, in large part,

on the strong presumption against intestacy, noting that "[i]t is
not reasonable to infer that [the decedent] intended that almost
one-half

of her

considerable

estate—nearly

one-half million

dollars in value—be left adrift in the unchartered and uncertain
seas of intestacy."

Id. at 166.

It is similarly unreasonable to infer that the Testator
intended a substantial portion of his estate, an amount well over

12

The presumption against intestacy applies with particular
force to the phrase "remaining items of personal property," because
the Testator employed language resembling a residuary devise. See,
e.g.. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 383 S.E.2d at 440; Estate of Rose,
772 S.W.2d at 889.
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a million dollars,13 to be "left adrift in the unchartered and
uncertain seas of intestacy.If

Id. For this reason, the provisions

of the THIRD Article of his Will should be construed broadly to
dispose of all of the "rest, residue, and remainder" of the
Testator's personal property.
1.

Article SIXTH and Article THIRD, subsection E.
cannot both be reasonably construed as devises of
"personal effects."

Petitioner

contends, however, that

the THIRD

and SIXTH

Articles of the Will do not dispose of all of the Testator's
personal property. The Petitioner maintains that the SIXTH Article
of the Will should be construed as referring exclusively to the
Testator's "personal effects."

[Appellant's Brief, at 2 0.]

The

Petitioner subsequently examines the THIRD Article of the Will,
Subsection E., and asserts that the terms "personal property" and
"remaining items of personal property" also refer exclusively to
the Testator's "personal effects."

Petitioner suggests that the

location and language of Article THIRD, Subsection E., show that
Subsection E does not "affect all remaining personal property."
[Appellant's Brief, at 22-23.] These arguments should be rejected.
a.

Petitioner's narrow construction of the Will
is inconsistent with the all-encompassing
language of Article THIRD.

The first paragraph of the THIRD Article of the Will expresses
in clear and unmistakable terms the Testator's intent to dispose
of all of his personal property.

It is, therefore, incumbent upon

It is anticipated that the sale of the Testator's real
property alone will bring in over one million dollars.
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the Court to effectuate that intent, if at all possible. See Utah
Code Ann. §§ 75-2-603, 75-1-102 (1953); In re Estate of Wallich.
420 P. 2d at 42. Petitioner's narrow construction of Article THIRD,
Subsection E. as merely a "personal effects" provision contradicts
the Testator's clear intent expressed at the beginning of the
Article.

The Personal Representative's construction of Article

THIRD, Subsection

E.2

is therefore more reasonable than the

interpretation advanced by Petitioner.
b.

Petitioner's construction of Articles THIRD and
SIXTH violates the presumption that different
terms have different meanings.

Petitioner's construction of Articles THIRD and SIXTH
also violates the presumption that a testator's use of different
terms signifies different intended meanings.

In his Will, the

Testator employed the following diverse terms in referring to his
property: "real property"

(SIXTH Article); "personal property"

(Will, THIRD Article); "all articles of personal, household or
domestic

use

or

adornment"

(Will, SIXTH Article);

"tangible

personal property" [Will, SIXTH Article]; and "remaining items of
personal property" (Will, THIRD Article, Subsection E.2.). Because
each of these terms is different, they must all be presumed to have
different meanings.
The

Petitioner

See Davisson, 97 N.E.2d at 695.
suggests,

contrary

to

this

cannon

of

construction, that the Testator did not intend different meanings
when he used these different terms.

He argues that the terms

"personal property" and "remaining items of personal property," as
used in Article THIRD subsection E., and the term
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"all articles

of personal, household or domestic use or adornment," as used in
Article

SIXTH, must

both

be

Testator's "personal effects."

construed

as

referring

to the

The Petitioner also assigns the

exact same meaning to the different words "items" and "articles"
as used in the THIRD and SIXTH Articles, even though the word
"items" is arguably more generic and broader in scope than the word
"articles."

Finally, the Petitioner's construction of the Will

gives the terms

"personal property" and

"remaining

items of

personal property," as used in Subsection E, a more restrictive
meaning than the term "tangible personal property." [Will, SEVENTH
Article.]

These significant interpretive inconsistencies in the

Petitioner's argument demonstrate the flaws in the Petitioner's
construction of the Will.
The only reasonable construction of these different terms
leads to the conclusion that the Testator intended to dispose of
all of his personal property under the Will:
The term "all articles of personal, household or domestic
use or adornment" likely refers to the Testator's personal
effects and, with the exceptions noted, the personal property
associated with the Testator's home.
The term "tangible personal property" refers to the
Testator's non-monetary personal property.
The term "personal property," being broader than the term
"tangible personal property," must refer, without limitation,
to all of the Testator's personal property "of whatsoever kind
and nature and wheresoever the same may be situated . . . ."
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[Will, THIRD Article.]

It is important to note that before

employing the term "personal property" in the THIRD Article
of the Will, the Testator states that he is devising "All the
rest, residue, and remainder of his estate, both real and
personal, of whatsoever kind and nature . . . ."
The

term

"remaining

items

of

personal

property,"

therefore, must be construed as referring to "all the rest,
residue, and remainder" of Testator's "personal property,"
other than those items of personal property specifically
devised in subsections A through E.I., of Article THIRD, and
the personal effects, which are disposed of in Article SIXTH.
Under

these

appropriate

definitions,

the

dispositive

provisions of the Will are sufficiently broad to dispose of all of
the Testator's personal property.
To the extent that the Petitioner has created any ambiguity
or uncertainty in the terms used in Articles THIRD, SIXTH, and
SEVENTH of the Will, Utah law provides two means of resolving the
dispute.
requires

First, the statutory presumption against
the

Court

to

adopt

the

Personal

intestacy

Representative's

"reasonable construction" of the Articles THIRD and SIXTH, which
leads to testacy, over the Petitioner's construction of those
provisions, which would result in intestacy as to the bulk of
Testator's estate. In re Estate of Gardner, 615 P.2d at 1217; see
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-604 (1953).
Second, to the extent that the terms "personal property,"
"remaining

items of personal property," and "all articles of
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personal, household and domestic use and adornment" are ambiguous,
extrinsic evidence is admissible to show the Testator's intent.
See Estate of Ashton, 804 P.2d at 542-43; Godfrey. 811 P.2d at
1251.

The extrinsic evidence in this case establishes that the

Testator intended Article THIRD, Subsection E.2., to pass all of
the Testator's personal property residue.

[Affidavit of James M.

Park J 12, R. 86.]
2.

Article SEVENTH does not recognize that personal
property would be left in the estate.

Petition also argues that the SEVENTH Article of the Will
recognizes the limited scope of Article THIRD. Petitioner suggests
that

the

District

Court

improperly

construed

the Testator's

instruction to sell any "tangible personal property and livestock
included in my estate and not effectively disposed of pursuant to
Articles THIRD and SIXTH hereof" as a "boilerplate catch-all
phrase."

These arguments should be rejected.
a.

Article SEVENTH merely recognizes that some
articles of "tangible personal property" may
not be distributed in kind.

The District Court properly concluded that the language of the
SEVENTH Article does not indicate that the Testator intended to die
partially intestate.

In light of the strong presumption against

intestacy and the Testator's other clear indications of his intent,
a reasonable construction of the language quoted by Petitioner is
that the Testator intended the Personal Representative to sell any
miscellaneous items of "tangible personal property" that were not
distributed in kind under the Will.

Those proceeds were then to

be "added to [the] estate" for use and distribution as money. This
s/scarritt/pldgs/appellee.gmh
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construction draws additional support from the fact that the
SEVENTH Article also references the sale of "livestock • . . not
effectively disposed of pursuant to Articles THIRD and SIXTH," when
the Testator knew that Article THIRD, Subsections C. and D. had
already disposed of "all race horse related livestock" and "all
other livestock and saddle horses • . . ."

The District Court,

therefore, properly viewed the provision in question as somewhat
of a "boilerplate catch-all phrase."
In the case of Kuiken v. Simonds. 3 N.J, 480, 70 A.2d 740
(1949), the court faced a similar textual difficulty in a will.
The will directed the testator's executors to sell all of his real
property, while a subsequent phrase directed the executors "to
divide all my then remaining estate both real and personal."
A. 2d at 743 (italics in original).

70

The court recognized that no

real property would remain in the estate after the executors1 sale
and simply ignored the later reference as inconsistent with the
testator's obvious intent.

Id.

Similarly, even if the language and placement of Articles
THIRD, SIXTH, and SEVENTH in the Testator's Will provides some
interpretive

difficulty,

this

Court

should

effectuate

the

Testator's obvious intent that his real property and remaining
"tangible personal property" be sold and that proceeds be added to
his estate for use and distribution under the Will.

As the

District Court aptly stated "[Any] technical problems [in the Will]
should not be applied in such a hypercritical fashion as to defeat
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the obvious intent of the testator."

[Order of Formal Probate,

Conclusions, 5 7, R. 34.]
b.

The provisions of the Will should not be
applied rigidly, in derogation of Testator's
clear intent to dispose of all property.

The provisions of the Will should not be construed rigidly,
one after another, without regard to the Testator's overall intent
and plan of distribution.

See Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-102 (1953);

In re Estate of Wallich, 420 P.2d at 42.

The fact that the sale

of the Ranch, together with any "tangible personal property" not
distributed in kind under Article THIRD, might not occur until
after the Personal Representative's initial distributions under
Articles THIRD and SIXTH does not indicate that the Testator
intended the residue of his personal property to pass in intestacy.
It simply means that the provisions of the Will must be construed
together and applied flexibly to effectuate the Testator's intent
that his real property and remaining "tangible personal property"
be sold and that the proceeds of sale be "added to" his estate for
use distribution

under the Will.

It would be a perfectly

reasonable construction of the Will for the Personal Representative
to make distributions of personal property in kind, as directed in
paragraphs THIRD and SIXTH; to sell the Ranch and any remaining
"tangible personal property;" and then to distribute the sale
proceeds as a "remaining item[] of personal property."
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3.

The manner of disposition of Article THIRD,
Subsection E.2. is completely consistent with
disposition of the residue of Testator's estate.

Petitioner argues

lastly, that the power of appointment

granted to the Personal Representative, to James M. Park, and to
the Testator's son, regarding the "remaining items of personal
property," [Will, Article THIRD, Subsection E.2.], is inconsistent
with

an

intent

to

dispose

of

anything

of

any

real value.

Petitioner suggests that this provision provides a manner of
distribution which "resembles a common method of disposing of
miscellaneous personal effects, divided up as close friends may
agree.

[Appellant's Brief, at 24.]

Petitioner's construction of this provision should be rejected
because more a reasonable view of this provision is available and
will avoid intestacy.

If Article THIRD, Subsection E.2., was

intended as nothing more than a bequest of miscellaneous "personal
effects," the Testator would not have thought it sufficiently
important to include on the committee the Personal Representative;
his attorney, James M. Park; and his son, Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr.
A request to the Personal Representative would have been more than
sufficient.

The District Court also found it "significant that

the testator included in this committee two of his close personal
friends and his son Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr.," Order of Formal
Probate, Findings, I 14, R. 31-32, indicating that the scope of
this provision is much greater than Petitioner suggests.
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C.

Alternatively,
the Court Could Reasonably Conclude that
the Testatorfs Personal Property Residue Passed under
Article SIXTH of the Will,

Alternatively, if this Court were to conclude that the only
reasonable interpretation of the term "personal property," as used
in Article THIRD, subsection E. of the Will, referred to the
Testator's

"personal

effects,"

the

phrase

"all

articles

of

personal, household, and domestic use or adornment," as used in
Article SIXTH, should be construed more broadly. While this phrase
ostensibly refers to the Testator's personal effects and the
property associated with his home, the Testator made the effort to
exclude, among other things, the personal property associated with
his

ranching

business.

These

exclusions

suggest

a broader

construction of the phrase "articles of personal, household and
domestic use" than "personal effects," This bequest also follows
the bequests made in Article THIRD, suggesting that the Testator
was disposing of all other personal property that remained.

The

Testator also made certain to except out of this devise the
personal property "selected and distributed" pursuant to Article
THIRD.
In In re Scheiner's Will, 215 Iowa 1101, 247 N.W. 532 (Iowa
1933), the court construed the similar phrase, "[a]ll my household
and personal property." The court concluded that the testator did
not intend to die intestate and that the phrase would be construed
to include all of the testator's personal property.
533-34.

247 N.W. at

It would, therefore, be a reasonable construction of the

Will that the Testator's personal property residue passed under
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Article SIXTH of the Will.

This construction would likewise be

consistent with the Testator's unmistakable intent to pass all of
his property under the Will and the statutory presumption against
intestacy.
In light of the Testator's clear intent to dispose of all of
his personal property, as established by the language of the will,
the definitions provided by the Utah Code, the strong presumption
against intestacy, and the Testator's use of different terms to
describe various types of personal property, the Petitioner's claim
that the Testator died partially intestate as to his personal
property should be rejected.
POINT V
THE TESTATOR DID NOT INTEND TO PASS A
MAJORITY OF HIS ESTATE BY INTESTATE SUCCESSION.
Finally, the NINTH Article of the Will clearly manifests the
Testator's intent with respect to the Petitioner:
I make no provision for my son, Ryan Winthrop
Scarritt, for the reason that he will be wellprovided for, following my death, under the
will of my father, Horace S. Scarritt.
The Testator included this provision in the Will, knowing that
Petitioner would share in trust properties amounting to several
million dollars. [Will, Article THIRD; Hearing Transcript, p. 27.]
The NINTH Article, therefore, clearly reveals the Testator's intent
that the Petitioner receive none of the Testator's property,
whether real or personal. It also explains the Testator's reasons
for omitting Petitioner from the Will.
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Since the Testator is presumed to know the law of intestate
succession, see, e.g. , Wallich v. Wallich. 10 Utah 2d 192, 350 P. 2d
614, 616 (1960), which would grant half of any intestate assets to
the Petitioner, see Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-103 (1) (a)

(1953), the

Petitioner's claim that the Testator intended to die intestate as
to almost his entire estate is completely inconsistent with the
Testator's intent as clearly expressed in the NINTH Article of the
Will.

The District Court aptly concluded:
The testator in paragraph NINTH of the
Will stated his express intent to make no
provision for his son Ryan W. Scarritt for the
reason that Ryan was or would be well provided
for under the Will of Horace S. Scarritt.
That intent is crystal clear, and were the
Court to find that Mr. Scarritt intended to
die intestate, it would be in direct
contravention of the express provisions of
paragraph NINTH of the Will.

[Order of Formal Probate, Findings, J 10, R. 31.]
CONCLUSION
For

all

of

these

reasons,

the

Personal

Representative

respectfully requests that the order of the District Court be
affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /^"~ day of April, 1992.
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE

^Ai.^.
Michael M0\Lat&f, Esq.
Gregory M.ftess^Esq.
Attorneys for Rodney K. Orton,
Personal Representative/
Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the /

day of April, 1992, I served

four copies of the foregoing "Appelleefs Brief" on the following
by depositing the same in the United States Mail, First Class
postage pre-paid, properly addressed to:
David Nuffer, Esq.
SNOW, NUFFER, ENGSTROM & DRAKE
90 East 200 North
P.O. Box 400
St. George, UT 84771-0400

Gregory M./
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ADDENDUM

Affidavit of James M. Park in Opposition to the
Petition of Ryan W. Scarritt [R. 83-97•]

Michael M. Later (3728)
Gregory M. Hess (5611)
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
P.O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Telephone: (801)532-7840
Michael w. Park (2516)
THE PARK FIRM
2 West St. George Boulevard
Ancestor Square Towers Bldg., Suite 32
P.O. Box 2438
St. George, Utah 84771
Telephone: (801) 673-8689
Attorneys for Rodney K. Orton, in his
capacity as Personal Representative
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
) AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES M. PARK
) IN OPPOSITION TO THE PETITION
) OF RYAN W. SCARRITT

CURTI-i S. SCARRITT,

i Probate No. 913500084
Deceased.

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.

COUNTY OF IRON

)

James M. Park, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes
and says:
1.

I was admitted to the practice of law on May 11,

1989, and am a member in good standing of the Utah State Bar,
2.

I drafted the Last Will and Testament of Curtiss S.

Scarritt (the "Will"), which is the subject of the "Petition for
Formal Probate of Will, Construction of Will, Declaration of

Partial Intestacy, and Supervised Administration" filed herein by
Ryan W. Scarritt on or about July 12, 1991 (the "Petition").
3.

Prior to drafting the Will, I discussed with Curtiss

S. Scarritt the manner in which he desired to dispose of his
estate.
4.

During our discussions, Curtiss S. Scarritt clearly

stated that he intended all of his property, whether real or
personal, and wherever situated, to pass under his will and not by
way of intestate succession.
5. Curtiss S. Scarritt also clearly expressed his intent
that the real property he owned in Virgin, Utah

(the "Ranch

Property") be sold, that the proceeds thereof be added to his
estate for use in paying his debts, the estate taxes, and the
expenses of administration, and that the remaining proceeds be
distributed in accordance with his will.
that under no condition

He emphatically stated

did he want the Ranch Property itself to

pass into the hands of either of his sons, Curtiss S. Scarritt,
Jr., or Ryan W. Scarritt.
6.

Curtiss S. Scarritt clearly expressed his intent

that, with the exception of several specific articles, his personal
effects and the personal property associated with his home should
be devised to his son, Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr.
7. Curtiss S. Scarritt further expressed his intent that
the residue of his personal property, of whatever kind or nature,
including

the remaining proceeds

from the sale of the Ranch

Property, be left in the power of Rodney K. Orton, Curtiss S.
2

Scarritt, Jr., and myself largely for distribution to Curtiss S.
Scarritt, Jr., after the payment of the debts, estate taxes, and
expenses of administration.
8.

Curtiss S. Scarritt clearly stated his intent that

none of his property, of whatever kind or nature, or wherever
situated, pass to his ex-wife, Donna L. Scarritt, or to his son,
Ryan W. Scarritt.
9.

After completing my discussions with Curtiss S.

Scarritt, I drafted the Will.

Curtiss S. Scarritt and I met

subsequently to review its various provisions.
10.

During our review of the THIRD Section of the Will,

Curtiss S. Scarritt clearly expressed his intent and understanding
that the phrase "the remaining items of personal property" as used
in subsection E.2. meant and included "(a)ll the rest, residue, and
remainder" of his personal property, of "whatsoever kind and nature
and wheresoever the same may be situated, " other than the personal
property he devised in other provisions of the Will and the
property associated with the Horace S. Scarritt Trust.

In short,

Curtiss S. Scarritt intended and understood subsection E.2. to be
a residual personal property clause.
11.

During our review of the SIXTH Section of the Will,

Curtiss S. Scarritt clearly expressed his intent and understanding
that the language "all articles of personal, household or domestic
use or adornment, which may be included in my Utah estate at my
death," excepting the personal property associated with his ranch
business, and the personal property specifically devised under the
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THIRD Section of the Will, meant and included essentially all of
his personal, effects and the other articles of personal property
associated with his home.
12. During our review of the SEVENTH Section of the Will,
Curtiss S. Scarritt clearly expressed his intent and understanding
that the language used therein required his personal representative
to sell the Ranch Property and to add the proceeds of the sale to
his estate for use in paying his debts, the estate taxes, and the
expenses of administration.

He also clearly expressed his intent

and understanding that the remaining proceeds of the sale of the
Ranch Property would be one of "the remaining items of personal
property" that would be distributed in accordance with subsection
E.2. of the THIRD Section of the Will.
13.

Curtiss S. Scarritt further expressed his intent and

understanding that the language "until such time as the ranch is
sold or for a period of time which shall be 1 .ft to the sole
discretion of my personal representative: and "at such time or
times and upon such terms and conditions as shall seem advisable, "
as used in the SEVENTH Section of the Will, meant only that the
timing, terms, and conditions of the sale of the Ranch Property
would be left to the discretion of his personal representative, not
that the sale of the Ranch Property itself would be discretionary.
14.

At the completion of our review of the Will, Curtiss

S. Scarritt expressed his intent and understanding that the Will
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disposed or all of his property, of whatever kind or nature, and
wherever situated, and that none of his property would pass by way
of intestate succession.
DATED this

/?#

day

of

August, 1991.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

/^J/>

day of

August^^ijg,^.....^^,^^ .„

w ^ ^ &*jhm i

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at: Cedar City, Utah

My Commission Expires:
June 8, 1993
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